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PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS:  
THE SIMPLE VIRTUES OF THE 
ORIGINAL FEDERAL RULE 
Daniel D. Blinka* 
INTRODUCTION 
How well do hearsay rules function under the current Federal Rules of 
Evidence?  One issue, dormant yet pulsating beneath the surface for 
decades, involves the admissibility of prior inconsistent statements by 
witnesses.  The long-standing “orthodox” rule admitted the prior statement 
only to impeach the witness’s trial testimony; it could not be used as 
substantive evidence of the facts asserted.  In 1972, the Advisory 
Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence (“the Advisory Committee” or 
“the Committee”) proposed an innovative rule permitting all prior 
inconsistent statements to be used both for impeachment and as substantive 
evidence—a sea change in practice.  Congress, however, torpedoed the 
proposal for reasons that rang hollow in the mid-1970s and which remain so 
today.  Experience has proven the Committee’s wisdom. 
One wondering how things might have been need only look to 
Wisconsin, which presciently adopted the original rule and has successfully 
applied it for over forty years. The state’s supreme court has aptly lauded 
the Rule as “simple, straightforward and workable,” high praise for any 
evidence rule.1  The original rule avoids insipid limiting instructions, 
pointless squabbles over how the prior statement is “really” being used as 
evidence, and, most importantly, admits reliable evidence.  The proposed 
rule was an excellent idea in 1972 and has proven itself in the laboratory of 
Wisconsin litigation.  It substantiates Stephen Saltzburg’s observation that 
“[j]uries do a good job with hearsay.”2  In this Article, I highlight some of 
the key features of the Wisconsin experience and the strengths of the 
original Federal Rule.3 
 
*  Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School.  J.D., Ph.D., University of 
Wisconsin-Madison. 
 
 1. State v. Beauchamp, 2011 WI 27, ¶ 43, 333 Wis.2d 1, 36, 796 N.W.2d 780, 798. 
 2. Symposium on Hearsay Reform, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1323, 1380 (2016). 
 3. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 908.01(4)(a)1 (2015) states: 
(4) STATEMENTS WHICH ARE NOT HEARSAY.  A statement is not hearsay if: 
(a) Prior statement by witness.  The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and 
is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is: 
1. Inconsistent with the declarant’s testimony. 
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I.  THE ORIGINAL RULE PROPOSAL 
Nearly all trials imaginable feature the use of prior inconsistent 
statements when challenging lay and expert witnesses.  Prior statements 
assume protean forms:  they may be oral statements uttered to a friend, 
written statements in an email, text, or printed report, or testimony given at 
a deposition or prior hearing.  Indeed, depositions are often taken with one 
eye on “discovery” and the other on stockpiling a veritable arsenal of prior 
statements—lightning bolts ready to be hurled at a witness who deviates 
from her earlier recounting.  Life experience teaches us that a person who 
tells more than one version of events may honestly be mistaken about 
events or lying about them; in either case, we question the witness’s 
credibility. 
The impeaching use of inconsistent statements is straightforward:  the 
“orthodox rule” decrees that such statements may be used to impeach the 
witness’s credibility at trial, yet are not admissible to prove the facts 
asserted in the prior statement.4  The mysterious distinction between 
impeaching use (proper) and substantive use (improper) necessitates 
ineffectual, nonsensical jury instructions that have been justly rebuked as “a 
mere verbal ritual” and “a futile gesture.”5  Essentially, juries have the 
common sense to do what the law forbids them to do:  “decide which of the 
two stories is true.”6  The orthodox rule is restricted to nonparty witnesses; 
by convention, when a party opponent testifies, her own prior inconsistent 
statements, like any other party admission, are freely admissible for all 
relevant purposes, including the statements’ truth.7 
In 1972, proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A) boldly 
provided that any prior inconsistent statement by any witness (party or 
nonparty) “subject to cross-examination” was exempt from the hearsay 
rule.8  Thus, the statement could be used as substantive or impeaching 
evidence as the parties might elect.  The requirement that the declarant 
testify as a witness meant that she was under oath and her demeanor was on 
display.  Prior inconsistent statements are also more likely true, having been 
made closer in time to the event and “less likely to be influenced by the 
 
The restyled version of current FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A) states: 
(d) STATEMENTS THAT ARE NOT HEARSAY.  A statement that meets the 
following conditions is not hearsay: 
(1) A Declarant-Witness’s Prior Statement.  The declarant testifies and is 
subject to cross-examination about a prior statement, and the statement: 
(A) is inconsistent with the declarant’s testimony and was given under 
penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding or in a 
deposition. 
 4. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §§ 251, 211 (Kenneth S. Broun et al. eds., 7th ed. 2013). 
 5. Gelhaar v. State, 41 Wis.2d 230, 240, 163 N.W.2d 609, 613 (1969) (emphasis 
omitted) (quoting CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 77 
(1954)).  The Advisory Committee politely described the distinction as “troublesome.” FED. 
R. EVID. 801(d)(1) advisory committee’s note. 
 6. Gelhaar, 163 N.W.2d at 613 (quoting MCCORMICK, supra note 5, at 77). 
 7. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A). 
 8. FED. R. EVID. 801(d) advisory committee’s note. 
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controversy that gave rise to the litigation.”9  In short, the “troublesome” 
features of the orthodox rule did not justify its continued use.10 
Congress was unpersuaded.  The House Committee on the Judiciary, 
doubling down on the oath and cross-examination features, proposed that 
the prior inconsistent statements themselves had to be made under oath, 
subject to cross-examination.11  The Advisory Committee trenchantly 
rebutted the House’s reasoning, which rested on misguided concerns over 
whether the prior statement was in fact made, the added value of the oath, 
and the utility of subsequent cross-examination.12  Although the Senate 
leaned strongly toward the Advisory Committee’s position, Congress 
compromised, producing the current Federal Rule, which unfortunately 
preserves most of the maligned orthodox rule while accomplishing little 
else.13 
Meanwhile, Wisconsin and a few other states had adopted the proposed 
federal rules even before Congress finished its revisions.14  In June 1973, 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court approved new evidence rules, effective in 
1974, that adopted many of the proposed federal rules.  The state’s review 
was both careful and eclectic.  Although other federal rules were rejected or 
modified, Wisconsin embraced the original Federal Rule on prior 
inconsistent statements without reservation.  The step was a relatively short 
one.  In the late 1960s, Wisconsin had dramatically curtailed the orthodox 
rule through case law allowing the substantive use of recorded statements 
(written or signed) by an opposing party’s witness, who was subject to 
cross-examination.15  The current rule lifted the restrictions to recorded 
statements and opposing witnesses, thereby allowing all prior inconsistent 
statements, in any form, to be used as substantive evidence.16 
II.  THE RULE’S PERFORMANCE SINCE 1973 
The sections below canvass the Rule’s performance since 1973.  It is 
based on Wisconsin appellate case law as well as my many discussions with 
trial judges at judicial education sessions through the years. 
A.  The Case Law Experience 
Evidence law is fundamentally a creature of the trial courts, but case law 
yields some measure of how well rules perform at trial.  Despite the 
 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. See infra note 13. 
 12. REPORT OF THE COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 40–41 (1974) 
[hereinafter REPORT OF THE COMM.]. 
 13. For the history of the Federal Rule, see 4 STEPHAN A. SALTZBURG, MICHAEL M. 
MARTIN & DANIEL J. CAPRA, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL § 801.02[3][b] (11th ed. 
2015). 
 14. See Order, In re Promulgation of Rules of Evidence for the State of Wisconsin, 59 
Wis.2d R1–R2 (1973). 
 15. Gelhaar v. State, 41 Wis.2d 230, 241, 163 N.W.2d 609, 614 (1969). 
 16. Judicial Council Committee’s Note, 59 Wis.2d R234 1973. 
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ubiquitous use of prior inconsistent statements at trial, there are only about 
forty Wisconsin appellate cases that address such statements generally and 
only twenty-four cases that invoke the Rule itself for any purpose.17  The 
count alone—less than one case per year since 1974—bespeaks a rule that 
functions well at trial and poses few headaches on appeal, unlike the morass 
of cases involving “other act” evidence or, more to the point, the battles 
over the current Federal Rule on prior inconsistent statements. 
Another noteworthy yet inscrutable outcome is that nearly all cases are 
criminal.  One explanation may be that in criminal cases, issues related to 
prior inconsistent statements may be raised in multiple settings, including 
through the confrontation right, ineffective assistance of counsel, and plain 
error.  Moreover, the prosecution’s high burden of proof in criminal cases 
likely induces more such appellate challenges by defendants, unlike the 
preponderance burden in civil cases. 
The striking absence of civil cases only underscores how well the Rule 
works at trial.  Trial judges and lawyers have few problems in applying the 
Rule.  Absent are unseemly quarrels over jury instructions that futilely 
distinguish between a prior statement’s use for impeachment and its 
substantive use, or trial counsel’s integrity in ostensibly offering the 
statement for a permissible purpose (credibility) while glibly disclaiming its 
use as substantive evidence—a distinction that is both intellectually 
untenable and (wisely) ignored by juries regardless. 
B.  Substantive Use As “Outcome Determinative”? 
There are no signs that a broader use of prior inconsistent statements as 
substantive evidence affects litigation outcomes.18  To be sure, no claim can 
be made that fewer than forty cases broadly reflects litigation outcomes 
generally, yet it is noteworthy and unsurprising that there are no cases in 
which sufficiency of the evidence to support a judgment turns on the 
substantive use of a prior inconsistent statement. 
Good trial lawyers understand that admissibility of evidence is 
overshadowed by concerns about probative value.  While prior inconsistent 
statements may be helpful and even highly probative, most often they are 
buttressed by corroborating evidence.  Apart from admissions by party-
opponents, which are doctrinally distinct, it is hard to imagine a prior 
inconsistent statement by a nonparty witness as a linchpin.  Thus, in one 
case where a defendant claimed that his conviction rested on the victim’s 
prior inconsistent statement, the court immediately pointed to abundant 
 
 17. Only about thirty-seven opinions, published and unpublished, by Wisconsin’s Court 
of Appeals and Supreme Court address “prior inconsistent statements.”  Unpublished 
opinions are used for illustrative purposes, not as authority.  The thirty-seven cases include 
challenges based on confrontation, sufficiency of evidence, or ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  The group of twenty-four includes cases where the rule, section 908.01(4)(a)1, is 
cited, regardless of any admissibility issues.  Space limits preclude any comprehensive 
assessment of the cases.  The complete list is in the author’s possession. 
 18. See Memorandum from Ken Broun to Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules 29 (Oct. 
9, 2015) (on file with the Fordham Law Review). 
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corroboration in the form of physical evidence and other testimony.19  The 
only civil case in which a party complained about a prior inconsistent 
statement (uttered to an ER nurse by the plaintiff’s friend, who had 
witnessed the accident!) involved an unsuccessful challenge to an 
arbitration panel’s award, not a trial.20 
Trials aside, a not unreasonable concern is that a broader substantive use 
of prior inconsistent statements might be manipulated to defeat summary 
judgment by falsely generating a material issue of fact.  Federal courts have 
readily coped with this problem in the so-called “sham affidavit” cases.21  
Over forty years of experience yields no cases of similar (unprofessional) 
mischief. 
C.  Proof of Prior Inconsistent Statements 
Critics of the proposed Federal Rule feared that parties and witnesses 
would succumb to the temptation to fabricate prior statements.22  Before 
adopting the original Federal Rule, Wisconsin too cautiously restricted the 
substantive use of prior inconsistent statements to an opposing party’s 
witnesses, further requiring that they have been written or recorded in some 
manner.23 
Predictably, there has been no parade of perjury.  Not a single case raised 
substantial concerns about whether the prior inconsistent statement had 
been made, whether it was oral or recorded in some form. 
This paucity is readily explainable.  First, lawyers must have a good faith 
basis for asking questions, which eliminates wholesale speculation when 
asking about a prior statement.24  Second, Rule 613 both compels disclosure 
of the statement upon opposing counsel’s request and requires that the 
witness be given an opportunity to explain or deny such statements before 
extrinsic evidence (i.e., another witness) may be used to prove up the prior 
statement.  And if the case law is representative, it would seem that far 
more witnesses claim not to recall their prior statements than deny having 
made them in the first place.25  Third, proof of a prior statement that is 
denied or “forgotten” presupposes some other witness who is willing to 
testify to its having been made; if fabrication is feared, such concerns 
further presuppose that this other witness is hearty enough to risk cross-
examination and commit perjury.  The danger is hardly epidemic.  Fourth, 
 
 19. State v. Lewallen, 2007 WI App 230, ¶¶ 15–19, 306 Wis.2d 126, 740 N.W.2d 902 (a 
victim of a brutal beating and sexual assault recanted her allegations against the defendant, 
her boyfriend, but her prior incriminating statements to a nurse and testimony at a 
preliminary examination were abundantly corroborated by medical evidence and testimony 
by other witnesses). 
 20. Miller v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 151 Wis.2d 784, 447 N.W.2d 394 (Wis. Ct. 
App. 1989). 
 21. See, e.g., Cook v. O’Neill, 803 F.3d 296, 298–99 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 22. See REPORT OF THE COMM., supra note 12, at 40. 
 23. Gelhaar v. State, 41 Wis.2d 230, 241, 163 N.W.2d 609, 614 (1969). 
 24. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 4, § 37. 
 25. Id.; see, e.g., State v. Nelis, 2007 WI 58, ¶ 11, 300 Wis.2d 415, 733 N.W.2d 619, 
622. 
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fabrication is not a hearsay issue as such.  Rather, it presents an issue of 
conditional admissibility:  Is there sufficient proof from which a reasonable 
trier of fact could find that the statement was made?26  Juries are well-suited 
to make this finding.  Finally, the very same concern is nonetheless present 
even if the prior statement is used solely for impeachment. 
D.  The Measure of “Inconsistency”? 
The stark simplicity of the original Federal Rule means that the only real 
issue of admissibility is whether the witness/declarant’s testimony is 
“inconsistent” with his or her prior statement.  Moreover, the measure of 
inconsistency does not turn on the substantive or impeaching use of a prior 
statement; the test is the same. 
Left undefined in the Rule’s text, “inconsistency” has come to mean any 
material variance between the testimony and the statement that is relevant 
to credibility.27  The relevance may point to a lie—whether in the testimony 
or the prior statement—or to a mistake rooted in the witness’s fallible 
memory or careless use of language. 
Essentially, the material variances involve three broad categories.  First, 
significant differences between the content of the witness’s testimony and 
her prior statements (e.g., “he hit me” versus “I tripped and fell down”) 
raise credibility flags.28  Second, there may be significant omissions 
between the statement and the testimony that trigger similar concerns.29  
For example, a witness at an accident scene provided a terse description to 
police yet testifies at trial in abundant detail—or just the opposite. 
A third category, the forgetful witness, dominates the cases and reflects 
the Rule’s evolution over time.  Early cases required the judge to find 
“reason to doubt the good faith” of a witness’s denial of a prior statement.30  
Later cases, however, quietly jettisoned the predicate of dubious good faith 
denials, allowing the use of prior inconsistencies without distinguishing 
between real or feigned memory lapses.31 
The embrace of genuine memory loss along with suspiciously selective 
lapses is a welcome development.  It is consistent with the broad material 
variance test as well as the approach taken under other hearsay rules and the 
 
 26. FED. R. EVID. 104(b). 
 27. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 4, § 34; see also United States v. 
Williams, 737 F.2d 594, 608 (7th Cir. 1984) (a broad approach to inconsistency is warranted 
“[a]s long as people speak in nonmathematical languages”). 
 28. See, e.g., State v. Lewallen, 2007 WI App 230, ¶ 15, 306 Wis.2d 126, 740 N.W.2d 
902. 
 29. See, e.g., State v. Robinson, 102 Wis.2d 343, 349–51, 306 N.W.2d 668, 672–73 
(1981) (describing a witness’s selective recall of only those facts helpful to the defendant, 
his friend). 
 30. State v. Lenarchick, 74 Wis.2d 425, 436, 247 N.W.2d 80, 87 (1976). 
 31. See, e.g., State v. Harrell, 2010 WI App 132, ¶ 21, 329 Wis.2d 480, 791 N.W.2d 
677, 685; State v. Rockette, 2006 WI App 103, ¶¶ 26–27, 294 Wis.2d 611, 718 N.W.2d 269, 
275 (focusing on confrontation). 
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confrontation right when dealing with forgetful witnesses.32  Genuine 
forgetfulness is as probative of credibility as selective recall.  Although 
“forgetfulness” is a ready refuge for liars, it also bespeaks a loss of memory 
or carelessness with words, which is just as troubling.  Moreover, juries are 
as skilled as judges in scrutinizing both lies and fallible memories.  Finally, 
whether the witness’s lapsed memory is genuine or feigned has no bearing 
on whether the prior statement is used substantively or for credibility.  The 
opportunity to cross-examine the witness/declarant insures sufficient 
reliability. 
E.  The Interplay of Rules 801(d)(1) and 613 
The key to the original Federal Rule 801(d)(1) was its intended interplay 
with Rule 613, which Wisconsin also adopted in its (near) original form.33  
Rule 613’s safeguards contemplate that a prior inconsistent statement is 
admissible as substantive evidence, as originally provided by the proposed 
Federal Rule.34  To that end, an opposing party can compel disclosure of the 
statement’s content when the witness is being examined, which guards 
against bad faith assertions while also juxtaposing the witness’s testimony 
with his earlier (differing) statements.35  Extrinsic evidence of a witness’s 
prior statement is inadmissible unless the declarant/witness was given an 
opportunity to explain or deny it, except in cases where “justice so 
requires.”36  Rule 613, then, builds on the “subject to” cross-examination 
element of section 908.01(4)(a), yet applies even when the prior statement 
is used only for impeachment.  Properly applied, the two rules closely focus 
on the essence of any alleged “inconsistency,” that is, in what way, and 
why, does the witness’s testimony differ from his earlier statement? 
Problems surface when Rule 613 is misapplied, especially when the 
witness is not examined about a prior statement before extrinsic evidence is 
offered.  For example, in a sexual assault case, a witness, Stone, testified to 
a lack of memory about the alleged assault, including whether he had told 
police that the victim was crying and her face a “bloody mess.”37  The 
prosecutor examined Stone about a signed statement he had given to one 
 
 32. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 4, § 34.  Some federal cases also support this 
view. See, e.g., United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 560–62 (1988) (describing how a 
brain-damaged beating victim testified at trial but lacked memory of the attack or an earlier 
photo identification and holding that the victim’s testimony nonetheless satisfied the 
confrontation right and Rule 801(d)(1)(C) (prior statement of identification)); Delaware v. 
Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 21–22 (1985) (holding no denial of the confrontation right even 
though the prosecution’s witness forgot the bases for his expert opinion); United States v. 
Gajo, 290 F.3d 922, 931 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 33. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 906.13 (2013); Judicial Council Committee’s Note, supra 
note 16, at R197–98. 
 34. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 4, § 37.  It is also predicated on a distressing 
fear of “widespread attorney incompetence,” which explains the many options the Rule 
provides trial judges when proper foundations are not followed. Id. 
 35. FED. R. EVID. 613(a); see also MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 4, § 37. 
 36. FED. R. EVID. 613(b) advisory committee’s note (charitably noting that “oversight” 
by counsel justifies some latitude); see also MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 4, § 37. 
 37. State v. Nelis, 2007 WI 58, ¶¶ 8–14, 300 Wis.2d 415, 421–23, 733 N.W.2d 619, 622. 
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officer but neglected to ask about a similar oral statement Stone had made 
to a second officer.38  Both officers testified to Stone’s statements.39  The 
court found no error because the defendant had failed to object on Rule 613 
grounds to testimony by the second officer about the oral statement.40  A 
concurring opinion, more to the point, concluded that witness Stone should 
have been explicitly questioned about both sets of statements, but there was 
no error because an “evidentiary vacuum” suggested that Stone was 
available for recall.41 
In sum, the problem was not hearsay, but rather the lawyers’ mishandling 
of Rule 613.  Although both parties flunked Rule 613, the prosecutor’s 
failure was the more glaring one because it explains why the defense never 
demanded disclosure under Rule 613(a) or pursued its “opportunity” to 
examine under Rule 613(b) while Stone was on the stand.42 
Thus, Rule 613 ensures that parties have an opportunity, at some point, to 
ask a witness to explain or deny earlier statements that vary from his or her 
testimony in court, thereby effectively juxtaposing the divergent stories.  
Whatever the testimony today or a witness’s earlier account, the jury is 
basing its credibility determination on what it sees and hears in the 
courtroom.  The “opportunity,” though, should not be left to chance.  
Especially when a prior inconsistent statement is used as substantive 
evidence, the witness should be explicitly examined about the statement so 
that opposing counsel can demand its disclosure and ask the witness to 
explain or deny it.43  Moreover, if the prior statement is not important 
enough to inquire about when the witness is on the stand, it is also likely 
not worth the time proving it through a second witness (i.e., extrinsic 
evidence). 
CONCLUSION 
The Advisory Committee’s proposal to permit the substantive use of 
prior inconsistent statements by witnesses was a wise decision in 1972 and 
remains so today.  The current Federal Rule covers an unhelpfully small 
band of hearsay while permitting skilled trial lawyers to circumvent it with 
ease by offering the same statements for “impeachment” rather than for 
their truth.  The outcome is silly, ineffectual limiting jury instructions that 
often mask the proponent’s true designs for the evidence and which insult 
the trier of fact’s common sense.  The Committee’s objections to the 
orthodox rule are as trenchant today as they were forty years ago.  The 
current Federal Rule is inadequate. 
 
 38. Id. ¶¶ 8–23. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. ¶¶ 29–34. 
 41. Id. ¶ 63, ¶ 70 (Bradley, J., concurring).  Likely, the court reasonably suspected that 
Stone’s memory had “failed” as to both sets of statements. 
 42. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 4, § 37 (constructing a “strong case” for a 
predicate cross-examination before resorting to extrinsic evidence, especially when the 
statement is only used for impeachment). 
 43. Id. 
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By contrast, Wisconsin’s experience working with the proposed rule 
since the early 1970s vindicates the Committee’s sagacity.  None of the 
problems provoked by the current Federal Rule are present in the cases.  
More important, those same cases have surfaced no new problems that 
bespeak unforeseen issues or failings that would suggest caution.  Rather, 
the Rule has proven itself to be “simple, straightforward and workable,” the 
essence of a good evidence rule. 
